26-0902: Wednesday's "Export/Import Daily Bugle"

(Source: 91 FR 56408, 2 Sep 2026) [Excerpts]

(Source: Future Federal Register)

(Source: DHS/CBP/CSMS)

(Source: CBP Office of Field Operations, 2 Sep 2026)

(Source: OTR Webinars)

(Source: Commerce/BIS)

(Source: State/DDTC)

(Source: Treasury/OFAC, 2 Sep 2026)

On July 1, 2026, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a recent actions notice, reminding U.S. persons holding blocked property as of June 30, 2026, to file an Annual Report of Blocked Property (ARBP) no later than September 30, 2026. Failure to file the ARBP by September 30 may lead to an enforcement referral. For additional information, review OFAC's Guidance on Filing the 2026 Annual Report of Blocked Property. OFAC is issuing:

OFAC has amended one Venezuela-related Frequently Asked Question, FAQ 1247.

(Source: The White House)

(Source: Breaking Defense News, 2 Sep 2026) [Excerpts]

     The Army today announced it has awarded AeroVironment (AV) a contract for the Enduring-High Energy Laser (E-HEL) program of record, marking what the service calls its first-ever production contract for a high-energy laser weapon. . . .
     Before today's announcement, executives from AV informed reporters of the award, stating that the Army will use AV's LOCUST X3 laser counter drone system. John Garrity, AV's vice president of directed-energy systems, said the contract is worth $464.8 million. . . .
     Under the award, which is an Other Transaction Authority agreement, AV will deliver "dozens" of LOCUST X3 systems to the Army "over the next few years," Garrity said. The company will be delivering "initial capabilities" within the year, he noted, adding that the company was previously scaling tens of systems a year, but is now capable of scaling "into the 20s per year." . . . [Full article]

(Source: Breaking Defense News, 2 Sep 2026) [Excerpts]

     The Army awarded production contracts to Palantir and Anduril totaling $192 million to move their next-generation mobile intelligence node to production, according to an announcement from the service Tuesday.
     The Tactical Intelligence Targeting Access Node (TITAN) program is the Army's next-generation ground system that will collect and disseminate intelligence to the battlefield, synthesizing it from joint and national assets based on Earth and in space.
     Palantir, which became the prime contractor in 2024 after participating in the prototyping effort, was awarded $127 million under the production deal. Anduril, which will develop much of the ruggedized hardware for the system, was given an award valued at $65 million.
     The awards cover procurement and integration of eight systems scheduled to be delivered over the next 18 months and comprise four advanced and four basic variants of TITAN. . . . [Full article]

(Source: Expeditors News, 1 Sep 2026) [Excerpts]

     In a Cargo Systems Messaging Service (CSMS) bulletin published on August 31, 2026, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) announced that, beginning September 14, 2026, the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) will reject entries where the copper primary country of smelt, and the country of cast information is not reported.
     The primary country of smelt and the country of cast will be required for certain copper articles imported from all non-U.S. origin countries. If either data element is unknown, importers may report the country as "other" with the code "OTH." If these data elements are missing, ACE will return the error message "F794 ADDTNL DEC TYPE RQRD FOR ARTICLE" and reject the entry summary.
     CSMS # 69711865 can be found HERE.

(Source: The Insider, 1 Sep 2026) [Excerpts]

     On Aug. 24, a federal court in the Eastern District of New York sentenced Manfred Gruber, a 61-year-old Italian citizen and former commercial director of an Italian arms company, to 18 months in prison for conspiracy to violate U.S. export laws. Gruber pleaded guilty to the charge on March 30.
     According to the U.S. Justice Department, Gruber organized the illegal export of more than $540,000 worth of U.S.-made ammunition produced by a Nebraska company and another supplier in Tennessee, routing it through JFK International Airport in New York.
     The shipments were declared for export to Italy, where the ammunition was required to remain as per official documents. Instead, prosecutors said, the cargo was routed to Russia via Kyrgyzstan.
     The case also involved Sergei Zharnovnikov, the owner of a Kyrgyz arms distributor, who previously pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 39 months in prison. A key piece of evidence consisted of correspondence found on Zharnovnikov's phone in which the men discussed breaking up shipments of 100,000 rounds into smaller orders in order to avoid attracting the attention of customs officials. . . . [Full article]

(Source: Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg Trade Report, 2 Sep 2026) [Excerpts]. Contact: [email protected], 1-305-894-1035

     U.S. Customs and Border Protection is accepting comments through Dec. 1 on possible changes to its regulations designed to give CBP greater visibility into the supply chains of imported goods. This is one of many actions CBP is expected to pursue to implement a June 2026 executive order directing a broad tightening of U.S. customs enforcement measures.

Overview: CBP is considering

     The intent of these proposals is "to more effectively detect and interdict illicit importations, especially those that are illegally transshipped to evade compliance with U.S. customs and trade laws."
     For importers, these changes could mean expanded recordkeeping obligations, new data collection and validation requirements, greater scrutiny of country-of-origin claims, more responsibility for obtaining information from foreign suppliers, and increased use of digital traceability tools and identifiers.
     With respect to the proposals outlined below, CBP is interested in comments on issues like these: . . .

Details:

[Full article]

(Source: Global Sanctions and Export Controls Blog, 1 Sep 2026) [Excerpts]

     On August 13, 2026, the Trump Administration introduced a combination of trade measures intended to expand export opportunities for US unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV or drone) manufacturers while increasing incentives to source and produce drone technologies in the United States. The actions reflect a concerted approach to strengthen the US drone sector and address concerns about supply chain resilience and national security.
     Streamlined Export Controls: The US Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security ("BIS") issued a final rule ("Final Rule") substantially easing export controls applicable to many commercial drones and related software and technology.
     The rule implements and expands upon the Administration's efforts to facilitate exports of US-manufactured drones and related technologies to foreign partners. The Final Rule follows an interim final rule ("IFR") published by BIS in January 2026 that made preliminary changes to US drone export controls.
     Taking into account public comments about the IFR, BIS determined that several longstanding control parameters no longer reflect current market realities and observed that many drone capabilities previously viewed as sensitive are now broadly accessible through commercial channels around the world.
     Among the most significant changes, the Final Rule removed wind-gust tolerance as a control criterion and substantially increased the flight-endurance threshold used to determine whether certain drones remain subject to national-security licensing requirements under Export Control Classification Number ("ECCN") 9A012 in the Export Administration Regulations ("EAR").
     BIS also removed particular national-security controls applicable to lower-endurance drones and made corresponding revisions affecting related software and technology. BIS retained restrictions applicable to sanctioned destinations and certain military end uses and end users, including by adding certain drone-related ECCNs to Supplement No. 2 of EAR Part 744.
     The Final Rule also revises the treatment of military-oriented drone platforms by clarifying when certain systems should be classified under ECCN 9A610 rather than under other ECCNs. Under the revised framework, the key inquiry is not simply a drone's performance characteristics, but whether the drone is "specially designed" for a military use.
     BIS indicated that a drone that is not enumerated on the US Munitions List administered by the US Department of State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls should be reviewed under ECCN 9A610 if it has been designed or modified to meet military requirements by incorporating at least one feature or capability that would not ordinarily be included for civil or commercial purposes.
     In addition, BIS created new ECCN 9A610.y.33for less-sensitive drone parts and accessories such as brackets, carrying cases, controllers, cables, adapters, chargers, docks, mounts, propellers, and propeller systems for military UAVs. . . .
     Section 232 Tariffs: . . .
     Most of the tariffs are scheduled to take effect tomorrow, September 3, 2026, while duties on certain component and smaller drones will not become effective until February 9, 2027, to allow domestic production capacity to develop.
     The proclamation also delays implementation of the tariffs for 180 days for importers on the Department of War's Blue UAS Cleared List, the Blue UAS Framework, or the FCC's Conditional Approval List. . . . [Full article]

(Source: Brownstein Client Alert, 2 Sep 2026) [Excerpts]

     CBP published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) today [see Item #1 above] that could significantly expand importers' documentation, supply chain mapping and reporting obligations.
     The proposal stems from President Trump's June 2026 Executive Order 14411, "Strengthening Customs Enforcement," and signals the administration's intent to give CBP greater visibility into global supply chains, foreign suppliers and goods entering the United States.
     While the ANPRM does not impose immediate requirements, it previews regulatory changes that could require importers to obtain foreign export records, adopt new supply chain identification systems, and meet heightened compliance obligations tied to national security and trusted trader programs. Comments are due Dec. 1, 2026.
     CBP has launched the first step in what could become the most significant expansion of importer supply chain disclosure requirements in years. Through this ANPRM, CBP is seeking public input on measures designed to improve visibility into the foreign entities, transactions and logistics networks supporting goods imported into the United States.
     Although the proposal does not create immediate legal obligations, it previews a regulatory framework that could require importers to collect and maintain information that historically has remained outside their direct control. Several proposals would shift greater compliance responsibility to importers for documenting and validating upstream supply chain activity.
     Key proposals under consideration include:

     Importers should view this ANPRM as an early opportunity to influence regulations that could substantially increase supply chain transparency, documentation, recordkeeping and diligence expectations. Comments are due by Dec. 1, 2026, and CBP will use stakeholder feedback to shape a future proposed rule. . . .

[Full article]

(Source: Braumiller advisories, 2 Sep 2026) [Excerpts]

     For those working in the export/import trade the term "brokering" would normally mean something to do with customs brokers. However, brokering also comes up in a completely different context: Export controls. What?
     The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) govern export of most defense articles and related technical data. Part 129 of the ITAR spells out the regulations on what is termed brokering. Part 129.2 defines a "broker" as any person ......who engages in the business of brokering activities." Brokering activities are "any action on behalf of another to facilitate the manufacture, export, permanent import, transfer, reexport, or retransfer of a U.S. or foreign defense article or defense service, regardless of its origin."
     Examples of brokering include: (1) Financing, insuring, transporting, or freight forwarding defense articles and defense services; or (2) Soliciting, promoting, negotiating, contracting for, arranging, or otherwise assisting in the purchase, sale, transfer, loan, or lease of a defense article or defense service.
     The persons and parties that are subject to the ITAR brokering regulations include:

     For the purpose of these regulations, a "person" can include a natural person or a corporation, partnership or other business organization.
     Hold it! Did the examples in Part 129 include freight forwarding? Parties and persons who perform brokering activities are required to register with DDTC and pay an annual fee. There are some exemptions to this registration requirement, including: "Persons exclusively in the business of financing, insuring, transporting, customs brokering, or freight forwarding, whose activities do not extend beyond financing, insuring, transporting, customs brokering, or freight forwarding." If the activities of the US party were to go beyond what is described here, it would be considered brokering, and the party would be required to register. . . .
     A party meeting the definition of a broker and registered with DDTC must first obtain the approval of DDTC before engaging in brokering activities involving any of the following:

     Where approval is required for brokering activities, the registered party must submit a request for approval to DDTC via DECCS. The request must be signed by an Empowered Official and must contain: . . . [Full article]

(Source: Export Law blog, 2 Sep 2026) [Excerpts]

     Recent reports suggest that BIS is considering eliminating a "loophole" under which China remotely accesses in foreign countries high-performance AI servers that could not themselves be exported to China. That would not be eliminating a loophole; rather it would be a departure from a longstanding policy.
     BIS's authority is described in, and constrained by, the Export Control Reform Act. It grants BIS the authority to regulate the "export, re-export, and in-country transfer" of a "commodity, software or technology." Technology is defined as "information, in tangible or intangible form, necessary for the development, production, or use of an item." These restrictions are the same as those found in prior authorizing statutes.
     In 2009, BIS made clear in an advisory opinion, relying on these statutory definitions, that remote access and cloud computing did not constitute an export within its regulatory jurisdiction. The access alone, it reasoned, "is not shipping or transmitting any commodity, software, or technology." ...
     If you think that remote access might be a transfer of "use" technology which could be controlled by BIS, the agency cut off that pathway as well all the way back in 2004. The agency said the mere operation of a dual use item by a foreign national is not a deemed export; rather, a deemed export occurs only when the foreign national is given information that would permit the foreign national to engage in all six activities defined as use, namely "[o]peration, installation (including on-site installation), maintenance (checking), repair, overhaul and refurbishing."
     Look, I get the desire to limit China's access to advanced computing resources. I do. But the proverbial horses have already escaped the proverbial barn and are grazing in fields of advanced computing power all over the world. And, how exactly is BIS going to root out violations? How will it know that the Chinese are accessing an advanced computing resource in the Duchy of Grand Fenwick or in a server farm in Uqbar?

[Full article]

Source: Skill Dynamics (previously Content Enablers)

(Source: Editor)

(Source: Brainy Quotes)

(Source: History Channel)

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25. Are Your Copies of Export/Import Regulations Current?

(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) but are updated as amended in the Federal Register. The latest amendments are listed below.