26-0911: Friday's "Export/Import Daily Bugle"

(Source: 91 FR 57787, 11 Sep 2026)

[Editor’s note: A new edition of Bartlett’s Annotated ITAR (BITAR) containing the above amendment, is available HERE.]

(Source: 91 FR 57794, 11 Sep 2026)

(Source: 91 FR 57795, 11 Sep 2026)

(Source: 91 FR 57791, 11 Sep 2026)

(Source: 91 FR 57793, 11 Sep 2026)

(Source: Future Federal Register)

(Source: DHS/CBP/CSMS)

(Source: OTR Webinars)

(Source: Commerce/BIS)

(Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 10 Sep 2026)

     DSCA posts Policy Memo 26-119, Establish Nonrecurring Cost Recoupment Charges for GUIDANCE SECTIONS, SINGLE VARIANT (AIR-TO-AIR), ADVANCED PRECISION KILL WEAPON SYSTEM (APKWS II)

     The associated Finding approves the nonrecurring cost (NC) recoupment pro rata charges for the sale, coproduction, or licensed production of the items shown on the Finding table.

     This memo updates AP1 - USML 4 - Launch Vehicles, Guided Missiles, Ballistic Missiles, Rockets, Torpedoes, Bombs And Mines.

(Source: State/DDTC)

     DECCS Licensing will be unavailable from Friday, September 11 at 5:00 PM ET through Monday, September 14 at 6:00 AM ET to support the Data Collection Modernization (DCM) production release.

     During this period, users will not be able to create, edit, or submit licensing applications.

     Continuation of Cyprus Defense Trade Policy in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations for Fiscal Year 2027. Secretary Rubio determined and certified to Congress that the Republic of Cyprus has met the necessary conditions under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 (P.L. 116-92) and the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-94, Div. J.) to allow the Department to approve licenses and other approvals for exports, reexports, and transfers of defense articles and defense services to the Republic of Cyprus for FY 2027.

     Secretary Rubio's actions continue the Department's existing policy, which first suspended the status of the Republic of Cyprus as a proscribed destination under § 126.1 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) on October 1, 2022.

     Therefore, the Department has published a Federal Register notice [see Item # 1 above] amending the ITAR § 126.1(r) to specify that the policy of denial as described in § 126.1(r) shall not apply with respect to exports, reexports, and transfers to the Republic of Cyprus for FY 2027, and that the Republic of Cyprus' status as a proscribed destination is suspended for FY 2027 with respect to exports, reexports, and transfers of defense articles and defense services.

     The Federal Register notice also amends the ITAR to suspend the policy of denial for retransfers and temporary imports destined for or originating in the Republic of Cyprus and brokering activities involving the Republic of Cyprus for FY 2027.

     Data Collection Modernization (DCM) Coming September 14, 2026, Modernizing DDTC's Licensing Experience. DDTC is pleased to announce the initial production release of the Data Collection Modernization initiative, deploying to the DECCS Production environment on September 14, 2026.

     The Data Collection Modernization initiative is a multi-phase effort to modernize how DDTC collects, manages, and uses data across its digital services. This initial release focuses on enhancements to the licensing experience that improve data quality, streamline application submission, and deliver a more modern, user-friendly experience for industry users.

     This release affects:

     If you have questions regarding this release, please contact the DECCS Help Desk at 202-663-2838 or [email protected].

(Source: The White House)

(Source: Expeditors News, 10 Sep 2026) [Excerpts]

     In a series of Presidential Proclamations published on September 8, 2026, the White House announced new trade measures affecting Canadian imports. The actions include modifications to the list of Canadian goods subject to Section 338 tariffs and the imposition of import bans on certain Canadian motorcycles, dairy products, and alcoholic beverages.

     Beginning September 15, 2026, Annex I will be updated to add several categories of Canadian goods to the list of products subject to Section 338 tariffs. Newly covered products include certain paper products, articles of steel, articles of aluminum, base metal products, furniture, cheese substitutes, hides, skins, and leather, golf carts, motorboats, among other goods.

     The updated Annex I also removes certain products from Section 338 tariffs such as certain cement, salt, bedding, fishing rods, and tissues.

     Starting on September 29, 2026, imports of certain Canadian goods into the United States will be prohibited. The banned products include:

     The Presidential Proclamations on the import bans state that if the ban is invalidated “in whole or in part” then the 50% Section 338 duty will apply to imports of that product.

     The “Modifying the Scope of the Products of Canada Subject to the Additional Duties Imposed to Offset Canadian Discrimination Against the Commerce of the United States with respect to Motor Vehicles” Presidential Proclamation is HERE.
    The “Modifying the Scope of the Products of Canada Subject to the Additional Duties Imposed to Offset Canadian Discrimination Against the Commerce of the United States with respect to Alcoholic Beverages” Presidential Proclamation is HERE:

     The “Excluding Certain Canadian Products from Importation into the United States in Response to the Continued Discrimination Against the Commerce of the United States with Respect to Motor Vehicles” Presidential Proclamation is HERE.
    The “Excluding Certain Canadian Products from Importation into the United States in Response to the Continued Discrimination Against the Commerce of the United States with Respect to Dairy” Presidential Proclamation is HERE.
    The “Excluding Certain Canadian Products from Importation into the United States in Response to the Continued Discrimination Against the Commerce of the United States with Respect to Alcoholic Beverages” Presidential Proclamation is HERE.

(Source: Yahoo Finance, 9 Sep 2026)

     NEW YORK, Sept 9 (Reuters) - A U.S. prosecutor described China's Huawei as a criminal enterprise that stole from American companies to build its telecommunications empire, as the trial against the tech giant kicked off in Brooklyn federal court on Wednesday. 

     "Theft, lies, cover-up," Taylor Stout, a trial ‌attorney from the U.S. Department of Justice, said in the government's opening statement. "For 20 years, that's how Huawei, a massive Chinese telecommunications company, victimized American companies ‌and abused the American financial system, all in an effort to dominate the telecommunications industry around the world."

     Huawei conspired to steal trade secrets from five U.S. companies, including operating system source code for internet routers ​from Cisco Systems and a robotic arm to test phones from T-Mobile, to gain an unfair competitive advantage and grow its business, the prosecutor told jurors.  "We'll hear from people who caught Huawei red-handed trying to steal American tech," Stout said, adding there was video of an employee stealing the robotic arm.

     The defense painted a very different picture of the company and its success in court.  "It's about competition, not conspiracy. Innovation, not theft. Ordinary business dealings, not criminal conduct," Brian Heberlig, one of a team of lawyers representing Huawei, said in his opening. "Huawei ‌earned its success...There was no blueprint for crime."

     Huawei is known ⁠for its telecommunications equipment, mobile phones and, in recent years, AI chips. It does business globally but its networking gear is restricted in the U.S. and suppliers are banned from exporting U.S. goods and technology to the company without approval from the Department of Commerce.  

     The case against Huawei began in 2018 with an indictment charging the company and its chief financial officer with bank fraud and sanctions violations for allegedly misrepresenting its business in Iran to get around U.S. sanctions and move millions of dollars through the U.S. financial system.  . . .  [Full article]

(Source: Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg Trade Report, 11 Sep 2026) [Excerpts].

Contact: [email protected], 1-305-894-1035

     The Department of Energy is accepting input through Oct. 9 to inform the actions it will take to implement an executive order banning imports of bulk-power system electric equipment from some foreign countries.

     The EO prohibits the importation, acquisition, transfer, or installation of any foreign-produced bulk-power system electric equipment that meets specified risk criteria and is designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by a “covered foreign entity;” i.e., a foreign country, or any person owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a government of a foreign country, that (1) is subject to a U.S. arms embargo or sanctions regime under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations or (2) has been determined to be engaged in conduct detrimental to U.S. national security or foreign policy.

     These prohibitions also extend to critical components, software, firmware, digital services, maintenance services, or remote access capabilities associated with covered equipment.

     The EO authorizes the DOE to (1) impose conditions on the continued use, operation, maintenance, servicing, or updating of foreign-manufactured or -operated bulk-power system electric equipment, (2) make measures to mitigate concerns a precondition to approval of a transaction or class of transactions, (3) consider regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that authorize conduct otherwise prohibited, and (4) establish criteria and procedures for recognizing particular equipment and vendors as prequalified for future transactions.

     The EO also directs the DOE to publish implementing regulations within 120 days; identify bulk-power system electric equipment associated with covered foreign entities that presents the risks described in the EO; and develop recommendations on ways to identify, inventory, isolate, monitor, or replace such items.

     To aid in these efforts the DOE is inviting comments on the following issues:  . . .   [Full article]

(Source: Export Law blog, 11 Sep 2026) [Excerpts]

* Author: Clif Burns, Clark Hill LLP

     Ab unnamed U.S. person has agreed to pay to OFAC $1,427,230 to settle allegations that, among other things, he violated U.S. sanctions by providing services to an unnamed Iranian company he owned. He founded the company while he was living in Iran and before he became a U.S. person. 

     According to the OFAC Enforcement Release linked above, the violative services consisted of participating between June 2019 and August 2020 in 19 virtual meetings with senior officials of the Iranian company to discuss company matters.

     OFAC cited, as an aggravating factor, that this was a willful violation. The evidence that this was a willful violation is frankly pretty thin gruel. Nothing in the Enforcement Release shows any effort by the U.S. person to hide or conceal his activities. 

     Instead, OFAC provides this:  “Throughout the relevant time period, U.S. Person-1 was aware of U.S. sanctions on Iran. In 2000 . . . [he] co-authored an article in a leading newspaper about Iran’s digital revolution and the challenges of the Iran sanctions program to Iran’s information technology sector.”

     And this: “U.S. Person-1 is a sophisticated businessperson who spent decades working in Iran’s information technology sector . . . aware of the impact of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s information technology sector.”

     There is little doubt that he knew, and these factors support that he knew, that he could not send items to Iran. But this is far from proving he knew that a phone call to Iran was a violation. Also, why, as a newly-minted permanent resident, would he want to jeopardize that valuable status by violating the Iran sanctions?

     Don’t get me wrong. These virtual meetings were indeed punishable violations. Penalties can be imposed even without knowledge of wrongdoing by the violator. There really is no need or reason to juice up these charges with shaky willful conduct allegations.

     Bonus Observation: OFAC pretends to be concerned, for some reason, about the identity of the players here, but the agency reveals enough information that, if you know how to use Google, you can quickly figure out the name of the company and the likely identity of the individual. Several mentioned and irrelevant facts could have been omitted to prevent that from happening.

     Bonus Question: By protecting the Iranian company through concealing its name, is OFAC providing a service to that company in Iran?

(Source: International and Litigation Alert, 11 Sep 2026) [Excerpts]

     With Operation Economic Outcast against Iran in its third week, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has taken significant action under one of its new sectoral sanctions determinations by targeting Iran's aviation sector. On September 8, 2026, in addition to imposing sanctions on 36 parties, OFAC suspended several general licenses (GLs) relating to flights to/from and over Iran, meaning that U.S. sanctions will make it very challenging, if not impossible, for even non-Iranian carriers to conduct such flights. 

     New Sanctions Designations Focused on Aviation Sector: OFAC sanctioned 27 Iranian airlines as well as nine parties in third countries involved in Iranian procurement of commercial aircraft/parts, cargo service providers, and general sales agents that serviced international flights by the sanctioned Mahan Air.   . . .

     Suspension of Aviation-Related GLs: OFAC also suspended three Iran-related aviation GLs that allowed payments for overflights (31 CFR 560.522), bunkering goods or services and emergency repairs for non-Iranian carriers traveling to/from Iran (31 CFR 560.529), and non-U.S. airlines to fly to/from Iran on temporary sojourn (Iran GL J-1). 

      Wind-Down GLs: OFAC issued two GLs in connection with these actions: (1) Counterterrorism GL No. 37, authorizing certain wind-down transactions involving three of the newly sanctioned entities (two in Türkiye and one in the United Arab Emirates) through 12:01 a.m. EDT on September 23, 2026; and (2) Iran GL DD, authorizing the wind down of transactions previously authorized under the three suspended GLs through 12:01 a.m. EDT on September 23, 2026.

     OFAC's Warning: In the press release, Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent described the action as a "warning to anyone doing business with Iran's remaining airlines… You are at risk of being cut off from the global financial system." The announcement further declares that "[a]ny foreign firm or individual enabling sanctioned Iranian airlines — including through aircraft transfers, cargo services, or general sales agent support — will face serious consequences for supporting the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism."

     Contemporaneous FinCEN Alert: At the same time, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued an alert to financial institutions with guidance to assist them in identifying and reporting procurement networks that support Iran's sanctioned aviation sector.    . . .  [Full article]

(Source: Global Trade Blog, 10 Sep 2026) [Excerpts]

* Principal Author: Stephan E. Becker, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP

     On September 8, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced a series of Iran sanctions actions under “Operation Economic Outcast” that target Iran’s aviation sector to date, and are unusual due to their breadth and targeting of civilian airlines. The actions were taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (counterterrorism authority), and Executive Order 13902 (targeting sectors of the Iranian economy):

     (1) Indefinite Suspension of General Licenses.  The U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced the indefinite suspension of the following three general licenses previously available under the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 560 (ITSR). The suspensions have implications for both U.S. sanctions (administered by OFAC) and export controls under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) for controlled U.S. items:

     After September 23, 2026, any activity that was previously authorized under these general licenses and is otherwise prohibited by the ITSR will require a specific license from OFAC.

     In addition, OFAC revoked 31 CFR § 560.528 (“Aircraft safety”). This provision established a licensing policy under which specific licenses could be issued on a case-by-case basis for the exportation or reexportation of goods, services, and technology to ensure the safety of civil aviation and the safe operation of U.S.-origin commercial passenger aircraft.  

  . . .  [Full article]

(Source: Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg Trade Report, 11 Sep 2026) [Excerpts]. Contact: [email protected], 1-305-894-1035

     A request for information from the International Trade Commission could be an opportunity for the trade community to help shape potential future Section 338 tariffs.

     Section 338 requires the ITC to “ascertain and at all times be informed of” any country practicing certain discriminatory actions that burden U.S. commerce, and to bring any such actions to the attention of the president and provide recommendations for action. 

     This law has been on the books for nearly a century but only recently was used for the first time to impose tariffs, on imports from Canada following a presidential determination that Ottawa had engaged in discriminatory treatment of U.S. commerce with respect to automobiles, alcoholic beverages, and dairy products.

     The ITC notes that it does not currently have an established practice for meeting its obligations as part of the Section 338 process and is therefore inviting comments by Nov. 9 on a number of related issues, including how it should obtain and analyze relevant information and the factors that may prevent members of the public from providing it.

     In the context of potential future Section 338 proceedings, however, and the possible import tariffs that could be imposed as a result, it is important to note that the ITC is asking for input on what makes foreign conduct unreasonable or discriminatory in the context of international commerce.

     The ITC also wants information on the specific methods and mechanisms by which such conduct burdens U.S. commerce, including with respect to the following:   . . .

     [Full article]

(Source: Jenny Hahn FD Associates)

(Source: Editor)

(Source: Brainy Quotes)

Friday Funnies:  Quotations on Aging

(Source: History Channel)

2001 — September 11 attacks. Al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four commercial airplanes in the United States. Two were flown into the World Trade Center towers in New York City, causing both to collapse. A third hit the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. The fourth, United Flight 93, crashed in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, after passengers fought back against the hijackers. Nearly 3,000 people were killed, making it the deadliest terrorist attack in history and a turning point in U.S. foreign and domestic policy, leading to the "War on Terror," the invasion of Afghanistan, and lasting changes to airport security.

25. Do You Need to Update Your Daily Bugle Profile?

(Source: Editor)

Don't miss an issue of the Daily Bugle if you change your email. Click here to manage your profile.

26. Are Your Copies of Export/Import Regulations Current?

(Source: Editor)

The official versions of the following regulations are published annually in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) but are updated as amended in the Federal Register. The latest amendments are listed below.